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Patent Assertion Entities, Reasonable Royalties, and a
Restitution Perspective
W. Keith Robinson*
The changing nature of patent litigation over the last fifty
years has forced patent stakeholders to think differently about
remedies for patent infringement.1 A major catalyst for changes in
how courts award specific remedies such as injunctions and attorney
fees has been the successful assertion of patents by entities that do
not practice the patent (aka Non-Practicing Entities (NPEs), Patent
Assertion Entities (PAEs), or, colloquially, patent trolls).2 Since lost
profits are not available to those who do not make, use, or sell the
invention, these claimants must recover no less than a reasonable
royalty. However, commentators disagree as to how this reasonable
royalty should be determined and what theories of recovery should
apply.3 In their forthcoming paper, Professors John M. Golden &
Karen E. Sandrik argue that the law of restitution is useful in
thinking about how a court can determine a reasonable royalty in the

* Associate Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Tsai Center for Law,
Science and Innovation, SMU Dedman School of Law. This essay is based on
comments presented at the 2016 Conference on Patent Damages at the University
of Texas School of Law concerning John M. Golden & Karen E. Sandrik, A
Restitution Perspective on Reasonable Royalties, 36 REV. LITIG. (forthcoming
2017). I would like to thank professors John M. Golden and Karen E. Sandrik for
the opportunity to read an early draft of their forthcoming paper.
1. See, e.g., W. Keith Robinson, Awarding Attorney Fees and Deterring
“Patent Trolls,” 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 281 passim (2016) (discussing the
impact of recent Supreme Court decisions concerning the remedy of awarding
attorney fees to the prevailing party).
2. See, e.g., Daniel Harris Brean, Ending Unreasonable Royalties: Why
Nominal Damages are Adequate to Compensate Patent Assertion Entities for
Infringement, 39 VT. L. REV. 867, 888 (2015) (arguing that the current
interpretation of the law permits patent assertion entities to receive windfall
damage awards improperly). Whether patent assertion entities are good or bad for
the patent system is beyond the scope of this essay. However, there is little doubt
that this modern trend in patent litigation affects the debate about reasonable
royalty determinations.
3. See Caprice L. Roberts, The Case for Restitution and Unjust Remedies in
Patent Law, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 653, 653 (2010) (arguing that restitution
and unjust enrichment remedies should be available for patent infringement); cf.
Amanda Frye, “Inextricably Intertwined”: A Restitution Perspective in Patent
Remedies, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 669, 670 n.3 (2013) (arguing for restitution
damages for patent infringement).
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absence of other types of proof.4 This essay briefly describes the
debate about reasonable royalties and explains how Golden &
Sandrik inject the conversation with new life by using restitution
theory as a lens for thinking differently about how a court might
determine reasonable royalties in a way that aligns with the
underlying purpose of the patent system.
To understand why patent stakeholders care about reasonable
royalty determinations, one must consider the current climate of
patent litigation. Over the last fifteen years, PAEs have been
prominent participants in patent litigation. 5 While there are
numerous characterizations of PAEs, the most despised of these
entities, patent trolls, use the threat and cost of patent litigation to
generate revenue.6 Some blame the U.S. civil procedure system for
the proliferation of patent troll litigation.7 In response, the Supreme
Court recently opined on cases concerning the remedies of injunctive
relief and attorney fees in ways that impact lawsuits involving all
PAEs.8 However, how a court should determine a reasonable royalty
in a suit involving a PAE is still an open question.
Section 284 of the Patent Act indicates that reasonable
royalties are a floor for recovery.9 There are various methods a court
may use to calculate a reasonable royalty.10 The debate over which
4. John M. Golden & Karen E. Sandrik, A Restitution Perspective on
Reasonable Royalties, 36 REV. LITIG. (forthcoming 2017).
5. PAEs are also referred to as patent trolls. “Patent troll” was first used in
2001 to describe an entity that, instead of commercializing its patented technology,
chose to license the technology to others. Brenda Sandburg, Trolling for Dollars,
THE RECORDER (July 30, 2001),
http://www.therecorder.com/id=900005370205/Trolling-forDollars?slreturn=20150911181220.
6. See Eric Rogers & Young Jeon, Inhibiting Patent Trolling: A New
Approach for Applying Rule 11, 12 NW. J. TECH & INTELL. PROP. 291, 301 (2014)
(acknowledging that a definition of “patent troll” is hard to obtain); see also
Kristen Osenga, Formerly Manufacturing Entities: Piercing the "Patent Troll"
Rhetoric, 47 CONN. L. REV. 435, 443 (2014) (discussing the etymology of the term
“patent troll”).
7. See Rogers & Jeon, supra note 6, at 298 (“A patent-trolling strategy’s
success largely derives from the high legal costs associated with defending against
a patent infringement claim, even if simply to get the claim dismissed at the
summary judgment stage.”).
8. See John F. O’Rourke et al., Silver, Garlic, and Attorney’s Fees, 56-OCT
ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 28 at 30 (Oct. 2014) (discussing the Supreme Court's shift
in favor of awarding attorney fees when litigation is “exceptional” or
“unreasonable”).
9. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2011).
10. St. Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1576–77 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (indicating that selecting the method for computing damages can be chosen
at the discretion of the court).
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method is best takes on added complexity when the entity asserting a
patent is a PAE. For example, should a reasonable royalty be
calculated using a compensatory perspective or should restitution
theory be employed? Compensatory damages are sufficient to
indemnify the patent owner for the loss suffered. 11 In contrast,
restitution damages are “awarded to a plaintiff when the defendant
has been unjustly enriched at the plaintiff’s expense.”12
Unlike compensatory damages, there is disagreement as to
whether restitution theory has any use in the calculation of a
reasonable royalty.
For example, Brean asserts that PAEs
improperly rely on restitutional facts and, as a result, are
overcompensated for infringement. 13 Brean argues that damages
should be compensatory in nature and based on the harm suffered by
the patent owner. 14 This idea appeals to those who dislike patent
trolls, because in most cases patent trolls have suffered no harm and
therefore will only recover nominal damages.15
Other commentators have rejected the pure compensatory
approach for restitution theory.16 In response to Brean’s concern that
a restitution theory of recovery will lead to over compensation for
PAEs, Amanda Frye suggests courts make recovery available only in
certain circumstances.17 For example, Frye limits recovery under a
restitution theory if litigation is abusive and in cases where the patent
has been asserted against innocent infringers.18
The forthcoming paper “A Restitution Perspective on
Reasonable Royalties” may help in solving the debate over how to
determine a reasonable royalty. The authors, Golden & Sandrik,
endorse restitution theory and suggest ways (referred to in their
paper as “cross-pollination possibilities”) that restitution principles
can alleviate concerns about how patent damages are calculated for
PAEs. The paper begins with a thorough examination of restitution
and unjust enrichment. Golden & Sandrik then explain how
restitution and patent law share some similarities in that they both (1)
seek to encourage parties to enter into licensing agreements and (2)
11. Compensatory Damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
12. Restitution Damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
13. Brean, supra note 2, at 868.
14. Id. at 870.
15. Id. at 882.
16. See Roberts, supra note 3, at 672 (supporting “an important unjust
enrichment remedy: disgorgement”); see also Frye, supra note 3, at 670 (noting
that the adoption of a pure compensatory approach “is not necessarily sound”).
17. See Frye, supra note 3, at 691–93 (“A restitution approach should take
these uses into account and not allow enhanced damages when they are present.”).
18. Id.
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seek to deter egregious behavior. Additionally, “A Restitution
Perspective on Reasonable Royalties” argues that restitution theory
can be used to arrive at a reasonable royalty that aligns with the
underlying purpose of the patent system. The remainder of this
essay discusses Golden & Sandrik’s efforts in greater detail and the
contribution they make to the patent damages debate.
“A Restitution Perspective on Reasonable Royalties” argues
that the law of restitution can provide useful guidance for how we
should think about the assessment of reasonable royalty damages.19
As noted above, this exercise is important given the current patent
litigation landscape and that reasonable royalties may be the only
realistic remedy available to patentees. According to Golden &
Sandrik, the advantage that the lens of restitution provides is that it is
a flexible approach that seems suited to discourage bad-faith
infringement and reward innovators.20
Given this goal, the paper sets forth some interesting
historical context. Historically, damages for patent infringement
were measured by a pre-established royalty rate, lost profits, nominal
damages, or disgorgement of the infringer’s profits.21 However, the
Supreme Court found that in the 1940s Congress eliminated the
disgorgement remedy when it eliminated the recovery of profits and
allowed a remedy only for the recovery of damages in patent
infringement suits.22 Despite the elimination of this remedy, courts
still struggle with several issues that made the disgorgement remedy
challenging to implement. 23 These issues include dealing with
uncertainty, complexity, and expert testimony.24
Determining a reasonable royalty requires the court to
consider a number of factors. In Georgia-Pacific v. Plywood
Corporation, the court set out fifteen factors that could be
considered, since referred to as the Georgia-Pacific factors. 25
Despite these enumerated factors, the consistency and fairness of
outcomes can be impacted by a court’s ability to use a number of

19. Golden & Sandrik, supra note 4, at 1.
20. Id. at 2.
21. 7 Donald S. Chisum, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.02[2] (2016).
22. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 505
(1964).
23. See generally Golden & Sandrik, supra note 4.
24. Id.at 11.
25. Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified sub nom. Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. PlywoodChampion Papers, Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
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methods, at its discretion.26 In addition to these methods, a court can
also vary its damage calculations based on the infringing activity.27
Golden & Sandrik suggest two specific areas where
restitution might be helpful in thinking about reasonable royalty
calculations: alternative measures for monetary relief and fault and
responsibility. 28 Under measures for monetary relief, the paper
asserts that the cost of the process of invention and the social value
of the invention could be used to arrive at a reasonable royalty.29
Golden & Sandrik argue that in addition to the existing
Georgia-Pacific factors, cost measures should also be considered.30
A cost-based measure would reward a patentee for the relevant cost
of the invention. 31 One implication of using cost-based measures
might be that it restricts remedies available to certain patentees. For
example, would this framework prevent PAEs from obtaining large
damage awards? The cost-based measures framework also seems
likely to favor companies with large R&D budgets, which may be
why Golden & Sandrik highlight the social and technical value of the
asserted patent as an important factor.32
Specifically, the authors claim that these considerations are in
harmony with the underlying purpose of the patent system and
mirror the way in which restitution uses liability concerns to resolve
difficult cases.33 But an open question remains as to how a court
would determine social value or technical significance of a patent
during its term.
A final advantage of embracing restitution theory is that
courts can consider the blameworthiness of a defendant in fashioning
a measure of recovery. 34 Golden & Sandrik identify two liability
concerns of interest: fault and responsibility.35 They argue that these
concerns can be used beyond determinations for attorney fees in
exceptional cases and can also be applied to the reasonable royalty
calculus.36
26. State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc. 883 F.2d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir.
1989).
27. See Bio-Rad Labs., Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 739 F.2d 604, 616
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (“To obtain lost profits, a patent owner must prove that he would
have made the sales but for the infringing activity.”).
28. Golden & Sandrik, supra note 4, at 25–26.
29. Golden & Sandrik, supra note 4, at 31–32.
30. Id. at 31.
31. Id. at 34.
32. Id. at 32.
33. Id. at 35–36.
34. Id. at 17.
35. Id. at 28.
36. Id. at 36.
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The paper also suggests five categories of blameworthiness:
(1) independent inventor, (2) infringer without notice, (3) infringer
with no mitigating characteristics, (4) infringers without notice of
some risk, and (5) conscious infringers. 37 There is evidence that
courts have applied a version of this fault or responsibility
framework. For example, in Stickle, the Federal Circuit supported
the idea that in setting the reasonable royalty, a court could consider
the fact that the party using the invention is an infringer, not a
willing licensee.38 Further, Sun Studs seems to suggest that courts
can consider who the infringer is and the commercial consequences
of their infringement.39
In sum, “A Restitution Perspective on Reasonable Royalties”
is an insightful work that acknowledges that patent law does not
exist in a vacuum. Golden & Sandrik contribute to the patent
damages debate by explaining how a considered examination of
restitution theory can help alleviate some of the concerns regarding
patent damages and patent assertion entities. Moreover, the paper
attempts to demonstrate how restitution theory aligns with
encouraging invention and innovation.

37. Id. at 37.
38. Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
39. See Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing Inc., 872 F.2d 978, 994 (Fed.
Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds by A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides
Const. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“We have recognized that
compensation for infringement can take cognizance of the actual commercial
consequences of the infringement, and that the hypothetical negotiators need not
act as if there had been no infringement, no litigation, and no erosion of market
position or patent value.”).

